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SWAPPING DEBT FOR EDUCATION: 
HARVARD AND ECUADOR PROVIDE A 
MODEL FOR RELIEF 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As of August 1990, the outstanding debt of Third World na-
tions had reached $1.3 trillion.l In Latin American countries, for 
example, debt service payments amount to almost half of the re-
ceipts from exports. 2 As of July 1990, Ecuador, the country on 
which this Note focuses, had an outstanding debt of approximately 
$11 billion. 3 
Through the years, creditors and debtor nations have devel-
oped various programs to deal with this now familiar debt crisis. 
The programs range from debt restructurings4 to debt-for-equity 
swaps5 to debt-for-nature swaps.6 In a unique agreement, Third 
World debt is now being used to promote education.7 On July 10, 
1990, Harvard University and Ecuador announced the signing of 
an agreement that instituted the first "debt-for-education" swap 
with a Third World nation.s In this swap, Harvard uses heavily 
discounted debt to create scholarships for Ecuadorian students to 
I Anthony Flint, When Nations Try to Swap Their Way Out of Debt, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 
19, 1990, at A14; see id. (listing the outstanding debt of major debtor nations). 
2 Christine A. Bogdanowicz-Bindert, The Debt Crisis: The Case of the Small and Medium 
Size Debtors, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 527, 531 (1985). 
3 Flint, supra note I, at AI4 ($10.9 billion); Haroard Sets Up Fund Switching Ecuador Debts 
into Scholarships, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1990, at 3 ($11.2 billion) (hereinafter Haroard Sets Up 
Fund). Ecuador owes 58% of this debt to commercial banks, 22% to international financial 
institutions, and 20% to foreign governments. Haroard Sets Up Fund, supra. 
4 See generally Charles F. Meissner, Crisis as an Opportunity for Change: A Commentary on 
the Debt Restructuring Process, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 613 (1985) (discussing the debt 
crisis and restructuring programs). 
5 See generally Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, A Compar'ative Analysis of Debt Equity Swap Programs 
in Five Major Debtor Countries, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 537 (1989) (discussing the 
debt-equity swaps of Chile, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and the Philippines). 
6 See generally Timothy B. Hamlin, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New Strategy for Protecting 
Environmental Interests in Developing Nations, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1065 (1989). Holland and Brazil 
have even completed a debt-for-soccer player swap. The Adventures of Banking's Mr. T, INSTI-
TUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1990, at 143, 143. In the most recent twist on the debt swap, the 
Catholic Church in Ecuador announced its intention to buy $28 million of Ecuador's dis-
counted foreign debt to help Ecuadorian Indian groups buy their land. Catholic Church Plans 
to Buy $28 Million of Ecuadoran Debt, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1990, at 4. 
7 Flint, supra note I, at A 14. 
8 Anthony Flint, Turning Ecuadorean Debt into Scholarships, BOSTON GLOBE, July II, 1990, 
at 25. 
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study at Harvard and research opportunities in Ecuador for Har-
vard faculty and studentsY 
The only way a Lesser Developed Country (LDC) can reduce 
its debt is through economic growth, which occurs with an educated 
population who can work in and competently govern its country. 
While debt-for-education swaps cannot significantly reduce debt, 
they can play a significant role in providing human expertise to 
resolve some of the problems that led to the debt crisis.1O Debt 
swaps, in general, enable banks to realize some value on non per-
forming debt. 11 Additionally, banks can often take tax deductions 
for any realized IOSS.12 If intermediary parties participate in the debt 
swap, they also benefit from various tax deductions. 13 
Part II of this Note focuses on various alternatives for dealing 
with the debt crisis. Section A briefly describes a debt restructuring 
program, while section B explains how debt-for-equity swaps work. 
Section B also discusses the different regulations debtor nations 
impose on debt swaps, the benefits and drawbacks for each of the 
parties to the transaction, and the tax implications involved. Finally, 
in section C, a discussion of debt-for-nature swaps will ensue. 14 Part 
III then analyzes in detail the debt-for-education swap between 
Harvard and Ecuador. Section A explores the emergence of debt-
for-education swaps. Section B introduces the agreement between 
Harvard and Ecuador, while section C details the debt-for-education 
swap. Section D discusses the duties and obligations of the parties 
to the agreement. Sections E and F explore the benefits and risks 
of the swap. Finally, section G considers the present status of the 
program. The Note concludes with a look at the future of debt-for-
education swaps, both for Harvard and for other educational insti-
tutions. 
9 Madhavi Sunder, Harvard Signs First Debtjor-Scholarship Deal with Ecuador, HARV. CRIM-
SON, July 13, 1990, at 1; Interview with Ned Strong, Area Director of Latin American 
Scholarship Program of American Universities, in Boston, Mass. (Oct. 30, 1990) [hereinafter 
Strong Interview I). 
\0 See Education: Cash Crunch to Hobble Education Efforts, IPS, Mar. 5, 1990, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File; Latin America: Illiteracy Means Social Isolation to 40 Million, 
IPS, Sept. 7, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES File. 
II See Tina Hofmann, Note, International Debt: Debt-to-Equity Swaps, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 
507,507-08 (1987). 
12 See infra notes 92-147 and accompanying text. 
13 See id. 
14 Debt-for-nature swaps are procedurally similar to debt-for-education swaps and were 
the original source of the idea for debt-for-education swaps. Strong Interview I, supra note 
9. 
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II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SOME ALTERNATIVES FOR DEALING WITH 
THE DEBT CRISIS OF LDCs 
A. Debt Restructurings 
Since Mexico declared in August 1982 that it would not be able 
to service its debt, creditor banks and governments have been at-
tempting to develop various programs to deal with the ensuing debt 
crisis. 15 When Mexico declared "bankruptcy," its government 
claimed that it could still make the interest payments on the debt, 
but would have to restructure the principal payments. 16 Banks 
quickly realized that they would have to participate in financial 
restructuring to foster economic growth in Third World countries 
like Mexico,l7 At the same time, however, banks would have to 
satisfy regulatory guidelines with sufficient debt service. 18 These 
problems gave rise to formal debt restructuring programs. 
All debt restructuring plans generally follow similar steps, with 
each country tailoring the agreement with the banks to meet its own 
particular political and economic needs. 19 The fundamental idea of 
15 Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 2, at 527. The debt crisis affects everyone: inter-
national financial institutions, debtor countries, and even the American people. For example, 
the inability of debtor countries to pay their loans forced many banks to restructure their 
Third World loans and lend "new money" in order to receive interest on the outstanding 
loans. See id. at 529; Meissner, supra note 4, at 620. Some statistics may put the debt crisis 
into perspective: 
In June 1982, U.S. banks held LDC debt equal to 211 percent of U.S. bank capital 
and LDC debt owed to the largest nine U.S. banks was 323 percent of their capital. 
Debt owed by Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico to all U.S. banks equalled 82 percent 
of the U.S. banks [sic] capital; debt owed by these three countries to the largest nine 
U.S. banks equalled 116 percent of their capital. 
Jerome I. Levinson, A Perspective on the Debt Crisis, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 489, 503 
(1989) (quoting UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INT'L BANKING: SUPERVISION 
OF OVERSEAS LENDING IS INADEQUATE 27 (1988)). 
Because debtor countries need much of their money to service foreign debt, the debt 
crisis potentially inhibits the ability of many debtor countries to modernize structures within 
their societies. As a result, many countries experience difficulty in becoming socially and 
economically more competitive and socially and politically more stable. ld. at 489. Finally, 
the debt crisis affects the United States' export market and the people who work in this area 
because debtor nations have little or no money to pay for goods imported from the United 
States. See id. at 509. 
16 Meissner, supra note 4, at 619. This article by Charles Meissner provides a general 
commentary on the debt restructuring process for the larger LDCs. 
17 Charles F. Meissner, Debt: Reform Without Governments, 63 FOREIGN POL'y 81, 82-83 
(1984). 
18 ld. 
19 Meissner, supra note 4, at 621. Most countries base their agreements generally on 
Mexico's restructuring agreement of 1984.ld.; see also Meissner, supra note 17, at 87-88. 
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a debt restructuring plan is to extend the original term of the loan 
by rescheduling the principal payments and to loan the debtor 
country "new money" to pay the outstanding interest. 20 "New 
money," however, is a misleading term.21 The debtor country re-
ceives a new loan, with interest, to pay the outstanding interest on 
the original loan.22 This new money thus increases the debtor na-
tion's indebtedness and leads to a longer term problem of solvency23 
as immediate obligations disappear into the future. 24 In addition, 
restructuring and assuming new debt is even more complicated for 
some debtor countries because their creditors have already attained 
the legal lending limit for those countries.25 Despite these problems, 
many countries at this time have negotiated debt restructurings or 
are in the process of negotiations.26 
Large debtor countries with greater outstanding debts, such as 
Mexico and Brazil, utilize the debt restructuring process on a 
greater scale than do smaller LDCs, such as Ecuador, Peru, Chile, 
and Bolivia.27 Because these smaller debtor countries do not impact 
the international financial system on a large scale,28 their leverage 
is weak and they have difficulty attracting the resources necessary 
to alleviate their debt problems.29 For example, Mexico, with a $90.7 
billion debt, can cause more harm to creditors if it cannot service 
its debt than can a smaller country, like Ecuador, with less outstand-
20 See Meissner, supra note 4, at 620; Meissner, supra note 17, at 82-83. 
21 Meissner, supra note 17, at 87. 
22 See id. 
23 See Meissner, supra note 4, at 620. 
2. [d. 
25 Meissner, supra note 17, at 87. 
26 Meissner, supra note 4, at 630. Chart 1 in this article lists the LDCs that requested 
restructuring between 1978 and 1984. [d. (chart 1). Ecuador is currently negotiating a debt 
restructuring agreement. Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
27 Meissner, supra note 4, at 615. Meissner defines large debtor countries as "advanced 
developing countries with large debts to the international commercial banking system." [d. 
at 631 (chart 3). 
28 Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 2, at 527. Smaller countries do participate in debt 
restructurings; however, regional banks, from which smaller debtor countries usually received 
their original loans, are less willing to lend new money to these countries. [d. at 529. Large 
commercial banks are likewise unwilling to support them. [d. Most of the largest banks have 
avoided selling significant pieces of their LDC debt, although they are actively trading debt 
on the secondary market. See Suzanna Andrews, Debt Forgiveness Gains Ground, INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTOR, Apr. 1988, at 220, 220. These banks believe that, in the long run, Latin American 
countries will recover and the loans will regain much of their value. [d. Bogdanowicz-Bindert 
states that the key to solving the smaller LDCs' debt problems is structural adjustment. 
Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 2, at 530. There are only a small number of policymakers, 
however, who are experienced enough to deal with the issues. [d. 
29 Meissner, supra note 4, at 615. 
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ing debt. 30 Consequently, creditors are less pressed to restructure 
small LDC debts because they have larger threats looming from 
large LDCs. 
B. Debtfor-Equity Swaps 
Economic growth is the only solution to the debt crisis for the 
smaller LDCs struggling with political and social problems.31 One 
way for debtor countries to achieve economic growth is to encourage 
investment by both foreign and domestic investors.32 Acting on this 
theory, and as an alternative to debt restructuring programs, many 
banks and debtor countries are choosing to participate in debt 
swaps, or debt conversions, to deal with LDC debt. 33 A "debt swap" 
is the act of buying discounted debt of a country-represented by 
a piece of paper releasing the debt-and exchanging the debt within 
the debtor country for local currency.34 The purchaser of the debt 
usually invests this local currency in the debtor country.35 The idea 
was inspired by creditor banks' wishes to reduce their exposure in 
LDCs.36 In addition, the debtor countries began to realize that 
increased investment by foreign investors benefits their economies.37 
For example, increased investment by foreign corporations poten-
tially creates more jobs for the people in the debtor nation. More-
over, debt swaps could encourage repatriation of capital that earlier 
flowed to industrialized countries and further aggravated the debt 
crisis.38 
'0 For a list of LDCs and their respective outstanding debts, see Flint, supra note I, at 
A14. 
" See Bogdanowicz-Bindert, supra note 2, at 529. From the debtor country's perspective, 
the main challenge is to pay their debt service while attempting to acquire enough foreign 
exchange to further economic growth. Meissner, supra note 17, at 82, 90. Ecuador remains 
a two class system: the wealthy and the poor. The wealthy continue to control the politics of 
the country, with frequent coups causing continual upheaval. The poor remain uneducated, 
especially in the rural areas where the elite government finds it easier to control a less 
educated population. See Laurel S. Walters, Debts Fund Scholars, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
July 30, 1990, at 14. 
32 Meissner, supra note 4, at 629. 
" Hofmann, supra note 11, at 508. As of May 1990, American banks had completed 
more than $132 million worth of debt swaps. Ecuador's Debt Is Used to Create Scholarships, N.V. 
TIMES, July 12, 1990, at A18 [hereinafter Debt to Create Scholarships] . 
... See Steve Reifenberg, Turning Bad Debt into Good Programs? LASPAU Explores 
Debt-for-Education Swaps 1 (June 1988) (Executive Summary) (copy on file at the Boston 
College Third World Law Journal office). 
" See id. 
'6 Hofmann, supra note 11, at 507. 
37 Id. 
,. See id. at 512. See generally Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 5 (informative analysis of debt-
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1. How Debt-for-Equity Swaps Work 
Debt-for-equity swaps generally adhere to the same basic 
scheme, and each country tailors its agreement to meet its specific 
needs.39 In a typical debt-for-equity swap, a bank holds an obligation 
for a certain amount of debt from a foreign country.40 An investor, 
for instance a company, that wants to invest in a country will pur-
chase that country's debt at a discount on the secondary market.41 
The company will present the debt to the debtor country, usually 
to its Central Bank,42 which will redeem the debt in local currency 
at a small discount, but close to face value.43 The company usually 
will then invest the currency in the debtor country according to that 
country's debt conversion regulations.44 Until the recent debt-for-
education swap, the buyer of the debt invested the local currency 
itself in the economy; most countries' laws prohibited the investor 
from converting the local currency received back into dollars.45 
equity conversions in Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and the Philippines). Repatriation of 
flight capital-capital that has flowed to other countries-in this sense means encouraging 
those persons who previously invested their capital in foreign countries to return that capital 
and invest it in the local economy. See Meissner, supra note 4, at 614. 
39 See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 5, at 540-65. This pattern is similar to debt restructur-
ings in that there is a basic model from which each country deviates somewhat. See id. 
40 Lawrence C. Berney, Note, Debt Equity Swaps in Developing Countries: Toward a Workable 
System, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 39, 41 (1989). 
41 The secondary debt market is a market for the sale of high-risk debt at a discount. 
See Reifenberg, supra note 34, at 3. A purchaser of debt on the primary market pays the face 
value of the debt. The banks created this secondary market initially to trade debt among 
themselves, therefore changing the composition of their Third World debt portfolios. An-
drews, supra note 28, at 220. For example, if a bank wanted to get rid of its Chilean debt 
and increase its Argentinean portfolio, it could swap its Chilean debt for Argentinean debt 
on the secondary market. Today, the secondary market has expanded to allow private 
investors, such as corporations or nonprofit organizations (like Harvard), to purchase debt 
at a discount directly on the secondary market. 
A broker often arranges the sale of the debt. Berney, supra note 40, at 41. At this point, 
the investor becomes the holder of the obligation. Technically, the investor now reserves the 
right to payment for the full amount of the debt, regardless of the amount paid for the debt. 
For example, if the investor buys a $100 obligation for 20% of its face value, the debtor 
country still owes $100 to investor as the new obligor. 
42 The Ecuadorian government operates the Central Bank. 6 ENCYCLOPAlDIA BRITANNICA 
289 (15th ed. 1983). 
43 Berney, supra note 40, at 41-42. Before performing the swap, the investor usually 
will need a waiver from the Central Bank. This waiver will obligate the Central Bank to 
redeem the debt. 
44 See generally Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 5 (discussing debt swap programs and regula-
tions in five countries). 
45 Berney, supra note 40, at 42. Until Ecuador's Regulation (see infra note 178) permitting 
proceeds from the swap to be used outside the country, debtor nations that were parties to 
the swaps usually prohibited immediate repatriation of capital. See infra note 57 and accom-
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This discussion raises the question why a debtor country, which 
would benefit most from secondary market discounts, simply does 
not repurchase its own debt directly on the secondary market. The 
answer is simple: banks forbid governments of debtor countries to 
use this procedure.46 Presumably, a fundamental assumption in 
these programs is that the debtor country is unable to service its 
foreign debt immediately. If the debtor country has the money to 
buy its debt on the secondary market, then most creditors will 
probably suspect that the country can service its debt. The lenders 
would rather continue to receive their interest, if the country can 
pay, than forgive a large percentage of the debt, which is the effec-
tive outcome of a debtor country's repurchase. 
2. Debtor Country Regulations 
There are two types of debt-for-equity swaps in which creditors, 
investors, and debtor countries can participate: foreign banks can 
convert some of their own debt into local investments in the LDC, 
or Multinational Corporations (MNCs) can buy debt from the sec-
ondary market and exchange it for local currency to invest in the 
country.47 The latter of these two swaps is more common.48 
Each debtor country has its own guidelines and restrictions for 
debt-for-equity swaps.49 Many countries, for example, distinguish 
panying text; see also Hofmann, supra note 11, at 514. Repatriation of capital-as distinguished 
from repatriation of flight capital-refers to taking the proceeds of a debt swap back into 
the investor's country instead of investing the proceeds, in local currency, in the debtor 
country. See id. For example, Mexico and Brazil prohibit redemption of the investment earlier 
than the schedule for repayment of the loan. [d.; Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 5, at 546-47. 
Thus, the investor could not convert debt bought at a discount into local currency for near 
the face amount of the debt, and then immediately convert the local currency received back 
into dollars for a greater return on his initial investment. See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 5, at 
546-47. Any payments the country makes must follow the agreed-upon repayment schedule. 
See id. In Chile, dividends accruing from the debt-equity investments may not be repatriated 
for four years, and capital may not be repatriated within the first tea years. Asiedu-Akrofi, 
supra note 5, at 543-44. 
46 Andrews, supra note 28, at 220. 
47 Berney, supra note 40, at 42; Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 5, at 539. 
48 Berney, supra note 40, at 42. Banks are more likely to swap debt among themselves 
in order to change the composition of their portfolios. Andrews, supra note 28, at 220. 
49 See Berney, supra note 40, at 39; William Ollard, The Debt Swappers, EUROMONEY, Aug. 
1986, at 67, 69; Hofmann, supra note 11, at 509-12. In addition, as a result of the LDCs' 
restrictive approach to direct foreign investment in the late 1960s and 1970s, creditors and 
investors were more cautious when the LDCs returned with their schemes to reduce com-
mercial borrowing. Berney, supra note 40, at 39-40. The investors now require some reas-
surances and impose strict guidelines of their own. [d. at 40. 
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"priority investments" from "non-priority investments."5o Priority 
investments generally include investments that promote an influx 
of foreign exchange as well as investments that promote programs 
that are socially beneficial to the country.5l Investors that swap debt 
for priority investments receive advantages that those in non-prior-
ity investments do not, usually in the form of reduced fees for 
currency exchange. 52 Countries also vary the percentage of the face 
value of the debt that they will convert into local currency. 53 More-
over, countries often differ in their agreements as to who may invest 
in corporations within the country. 54 Some countries, such as Chile, 
permit any and all foreigners and natural citizens to invest through 
debt swaps. 55 Other countries, such as Brazil, allow only original 
creditors and their assignees to convert the debt.56 Finally, most 
countries have restrictions on the repatriation of capital. 57 Many 
countries, however, are loosening their restrictions on debt conver-
SIons m an effort to make them more desirable to foreign inves-
tors.58 
3. Benefits and Drawbacks for Each of the Players 
Debt swaps initially look promising for the bank and the foreign 
country: they simultaneously retire foreign debts and promote pro-
ductive investment in the country. 59 In reality, however, debt swaps 
50 See Hofmann, supra note 11, at 510-11. 
51 Id. For example, the Philippines lists as priority investments, among others, export-
oriented firms, firms paid in foreign currency, firms producing agricultural goods, firms 
providing health care services, and firms constructing and renovating middle and low income 
housing and educational facilities. Id. 
52 Id. at 509-10. For example, in the Philippines, individuals or other parties who make 
priority investments pay a fee of 5%, while those who make non-priority investments pay a 
10% fee. Id. In Mexico, discounts on converted money range from 0% to 25% depending 
on the "priority status" of the investment. Id. at 511. 
53 Id. at 510-11 (compare the Philippines, where the Central Bank redeems the debt at 
face value, with Mexico, where the Mexican government redeems the debt at less than face 
value). For example, if a foreign investor wanted to contribute $50,000 of debt to a country 
in exchange for local currency to invest in the country, some countries may exchange 100% 
of the face value of the debt; others may only exchange 80% to 90% of the debt. Often 
foreign countries will base the discount on the priority or non-priority of the investment. Id. 
54 See Hofmann, supra note 11, at 510-11; Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 5, at 541-65. 
55 Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 5, at 541-42. 
56 /d. at 547. 
57 Hofmann, supra note 11, at 514. See generally Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 5. For a 
definition of repatriation of capital, see supra note 45. 
58 See Ollard, supra note 49, at 69; Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 5, at 543. 
59 Ollard, supra note 49, at 69. 
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have drawbacks as well as benefits for each of the players in the 
scheme: the debtor country, the bank, and the investor. 
For the debtor country, the benefits of a debt swap are varied. 
The discounted value of the debt reduces the cost of investing in 
the country, creating greater incentive for corporations to invest.6o 
The investor injects money into the country, which fosters economic 
growth.61 Economic growth, in turn, creates more jobs for the coun-
try's citizens.62 Another advantage of investment of foreign debt is 
that the investor, instead of the debtor country, bears the dual risks 
of devaluations in the exchange rates and inadequate profitability.63 
These transactions also encourage the repatriation of flight capital. 64 
As foreign investors and developers are more inclined to invest in 
a country that is economically growing or stable, the debt swap also 
potentially promotes an influx of other foreign exchange.65 
When a country reduces its obligations on foreign debt, it also 
lowers its payments for servicing debt.66 The country replaces debt 
liability that requires prompt attention with equity liability that will 
probably be easier to pay.67 The debt is now in local currency; thus, 
the burden on the country to repay the debt is lessened because the 
government controls the supply of local currency. 
Notwithstanding these advantages, critics contend that there 
are many problems with debt-for-equity swaps.68 They argue, for 
example, that the exchange of foreign debt for domestic currency 
increases the internal domestic debt of a country, possibly causing 
the country to lose control over its supply of money and rate of 
exchange.69 This potential inflationary pressure makes some debtor 
nations hesitant to participate in debt swaps.70 Most countries, how-
60 Hofmann, supra note 11, at 512. 
61 See Ollard, supra note 49, at 69. 
62 Stuart M. Berkson & Bruce A. Cohen, Tax Implications of Debt1or-Equity Swaps, 12 
HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 575, 576 (1989). 
6.'1 Hofmann, supra note 11, at 513. On the other hand, if the investment is successful, 
the country may end up paying more foreign exchange in dividends than it previously paid 
in interest on the original debt. Id. 
64 Id. at 512. For a definition of flight capital, see supra note 38. 
65 Hofmann, supra note 11, at 513. 
66 Id.; Berney, supra note 40, at 40. 
67 Berney, supra note 40, at 44. 
68 See id. at 45-47; Hofmann, supra note 11, at 512-15. 
69 Hofmann, supra note 11, at 515; Berney, supra note 40, at 43. Supporters of debt-
equity swaps reject this inflation argument, contending that increased investment has a 
positive impact on the country's economy. Hofmann, supra note 11, at 515. They reason that 
positive impact from increased production and more jobs partially offsets any negative 
inflationary pressures. /d. 
70 See Hofmann, supra note 11, at 515; Reifenberg, supra note 34, at 5. For example, 
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ever, have put restrictions on the amount of debt that foreign 
investors can convert into local currency.7l Thus, inflation is not a 
necessary threat if debtor countries know how to manage the con-
versions.72 
Critics also argue that investors would have invested money in 
the country anyway, and that the debt swap transactions award 
foreign investors, rather than debtor nations, the benefit of buying 
the country's debt at a discount. 73 They posit that the debt-for-
equity swaps allow debtor governments to prepay debt unnecessarily 
while giving the investor the advantage of buying the country's 
assets at a discount. 74 Finally, critics note that some debtor countries 
participating in debt restructuring programs75 fear that debt swaps 
reduce their debt and, consequently, reduce the amount of new 
money they receive from restructuring agreements.76 
The greatest benefit for a bank selling on the secondary market 
is that it removes undesirable debt from its balance sheet. 77 A bank 
sells on the secondary market because it believes the debtor country 
will never repay the debt. 78 Because keeping the loan on its balance 
sheet increases administrative costs, a smaller regional bank often 
finds it desirable to take a loss in the secondary market. 79 Smaller 
regional banks generally have smaller LDC portfolios and may find 
carrying the debt on their balance sheets to be administratively 
Ecuador originally was stalling on debt-equity swaps because it feared the effect they might 
have on the money supply. John Whitelaw, Ecuador Stalls on Equity Swaps, EUROMONEY, Jan. 
1987, at 135, 135. Specifically, the Ecuadorian government feared inflation caused by injection 
of sucres (Ecuador's currency) from large amounts of foreign debt into Ecuador's economy. 
/d. 
7I Hofmann, supra note 11, at 515. 
72 See id. 
73 [d. at 512. Debtor countries, however, may not repurchase their debt at a discount. 
Andrews, supra note 28, at 220. 
74 Hofmann, supra note 11, at 512. If critics are worried that foreign investors will 
consume the country's assets at less than fair market value, the numerous restrictions that 
most countries impose on foreign investment should allay their fears. See id. See generally 
Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 5 (discussing restrictions imposed on investors in Mexico, Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile, and the Philippines). 
75 For a discussion of debt restructuring programs, see supra notes 15-30 and accom-
panying text. 
76 Ollard, supra note 49, at 69. The amount of money a lender must contribute to 
restructuring reflects that lender's share of outstanding debt for that particular country. See 
Hofmann, supra note 11, at 515. As the principal amount of the debt decreases, the amount 
of interest owed decreases. Consequently, the amount of new money needed to make interest 
payments also decreases. 
77 Hofmann, supra note 11, at 512. 
78 Reifenberg, supra note 34, at 3. 
79 [d. at 10-11. 
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burdensome.8o Removing the debt from their books, therefore, is 
desirable. Larger banks, however, are less inclined to participate in 
debt swaps for a variety of reasons. First, the Federal Reserve re-
quires them to keep a certain amount of reserves8! for each LDC's 
debt. 82 In addition, because of negative accounting consequences, 
large banks often prefer to keep the loans on their balance sheets.83 
Finally, larger banks have the ability to restructure debts.84 Thus, 
they have new money to invest in the LDCs.85 
The investor, the third party in debt swaps, also receives many 
benefits from these transactions. First, the investor buys the debt at 
a discount, so it is able to reduce the cost of the investment.86 The 
investor is also able to get more foreign currency through debt 
swaps than it could by purchasing the currency at the official ex-
change rate.87 Internal regulations in the debtor country, however, 
create some drawbacks for the investor.88 Some countries have local 
restrictions on foreign ownership,89 and some of the restructuring 
80 Id. 
81 "Reserves" refers to the money a bank puts aside out of its present profits to cover 
debts it believes LDCs will not be able to repay. Telephone Interview with Gregory P. Buscone, 
Commercial Loan Officer, Shawmut Bank (Sept. 25, 1991). When an LDC fails to pay its 
debt, the bank takes the loss out of its reserves instead of deducting the loss from its profits. 
Id. For example, if a bank has profits of $100 million and believes that an LDC will not pay 
$50 million of debt, the bank puts aside $50 million of present profits in its reserves. Id. The 
bank's balance sheet will thus reflect only $50 million of profits for that year. Id. If the LDC 
actually fails to pay the $50 million debt, the bank will take the loss out of its reserves and 
its profits will remain at $50 million for the year. Id. 
82 Id. 
83 See Ollard, supra note 49, at 74; see also Meissner, supra note 17, at 86. Under current 
accounting standards, if a larger bank sold a portion of a given country's debt, the bank's 
entire portfolio for that country would have to be discounted at that same price. Meissner, 
supra note 17, at 86; see Ollard, supra note 49, at 74 (European banks more active in swapping, 
possibly because accounting consequences are different); Hofmann, supra note II, at 516. 
84 Meissner, supra note 4, at 621; see Meissner, supra note 17, at 82. 
85 Meissner, supra note 17, at 83. 
86 Hofmann, supra note 11, at 512. Even though the debtor countries usually redeem 
debt at a discount, the conversion value is above the secondary market price of the debt and 
near its face value. See Reifenberg, supra note 34, at 3-4. 
87 See Berney, supra note 40, at 42-43. For example, one may need $5,000,000 to 
exchange directly into sucres worth $2,500,000 at the official exchange rate. In the debt-for-
education swap, discussed infra at Part III, Harvard only needed to spend $775,000 to receive 
$2,500,000 worth of sucres. 
88 Ollard, supra note 49, at 73. 
89 For example, Mexico allows only a maximum of 49% ownership in Mexican compa-
nies. Hofmann, supra note II, at 514. The Philippines government limits foreign ownership 
to 40% of a company's equity holding, although it can be flexible on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
On the other hand, Chile places no ceiling on the percentage of foreign equity holdings in 
its companies. Id. at 514 n.54. 
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agreements prohibit lenders from assigning interest in the debt to 
entities other than banks or financial institutions.9o For banks and 
investors, however, the biggest drawback is the Internal Revenue 
Service's (IRS) Revenue Ruling 87-124.91 
4. Tax Implications of Debt Swaps 
Before Revenue Ruling 87-124, banks and investors, especially 
for-profit corporations, benefited from debt-for-equity swaps be-
cause the IRS did not tax any gain from the transactions.92 This tax 
treatment created an incentive for banks and MNCs to invest in 
Third World countries. Revenue Ruling 87-124, however, removed 
this tax benefit, and with it, much of the incentive to invest in Third 
World nations through the debt swap procedure.93 Now, investors 
must pay tax on any gain they receive through the swaps.94 Debtor 
country restrictions on repatriation of capital further frustrate the 
investors because they often do not receive actual cash from their 
investments to pay the taxes on any gain from the swap.95 For 
example, Bolivia and Venezuela prohibit repatriation of capital be-
fore a five-year period.96 Mexico and Brazil prohibit repatriation 
before twelve years.97 Thus, MNCs and banks cannot rely on money 
from the gain for immediate payment of taxes. 
Revenue Ruling 87-124 affects various debt swap situations 
differently. These situations may involve transactions among any 
combination of a United States bank that holds an obligation from 
a foreign country, an MNC, a charitable or non-profit organization, 
a foreign country's Central Bank, and a corporation from that 
country (foreign corporation). Different uses of a foreign country's 
90 Id. at 514-15. These restrictions on lenders arise from debtor countries' fears that if 
lenders assign their interests to an entity other than a bank or financial institution, the 
amount of new money the restructuring agreement requires the lender to contribute will 
also decrease. See ~upra note 76. 
91 Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205. 
9lI Berkson & Cohen, supra note 62, at 577. 
95 See id. 
94 See Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205. This gain results from the conversion of 
discounted debt, in dollars, to almost face value in local currency, and then the conversion 
of this larger amount of local currency back into dollars. The end result amounts to the 
investor receiving more dollars on the second conversion than it originally invested. Note 
that qualified charitable organizations do not have to pay tax on any gain. I.R.C. § 501 (West 
1991). 
95 Berkson & Cohen, supra note 62, at 579 n.8. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
1992] SWAPPING DEBT FOR EDUCATION 169 
obligation, illustrated in each of the following situations, result in 
different tax consequences for the participating parties. 
a. An MNC buys the obligation from a bank and invests in a foreign 
corporation98 
Assume that the bank holds a $100 obligation from the foreign 
country.99 Assume also that the foreign country's debt currently 
sells for 20% of its face value, or $20, on the secondary market, 
and that the MNC will buy this obligation for that amount. 100 Finally, 
assume that the Central Bank agrees to redeem the debt in local 
currency at 50% of its face value, or the equivalent of $50,101 but 
subject to the restriction that this local currency must be used in 
the foreign country in a manner approved by the country's govern-
ment. 102 When the bank sells the obligation to the MNC for $20, 
the bank recognizes l03 an $80 tax IOSS.104 The MNC's adjusted basis 
in the property becomes its purchase price of $20. 105 Next, the 
MNC redeems the obligation at the Central Bank for the equivalent 
of $50 in local currency, subject, however, to the above-mentioned 
restrictions. 106 The MNC recognizes a taxable gain equal to the 
98 This situation is similar to Situation 1 in Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205. 
99 Assume $100 is the bank's adjusted basis in the obligation. See I.R.C. § 1011 (West 
1991); Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205 (Facts). The adjusted basis in the obligation refers 
to the cost of the obligation to the bank, less any gains or losses the bank has actually 
recognized for tax purposes. See I.R.C. § IOll; I.R.C. § I016 (West 1991); MARVIN A. 
CHiRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 239 (5th ed. 1988). 
100 See Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205 (Facts). 
101 [d. 
102 [d. 
10. For the purposes of this Note, the term "recognize" means that the entity actually 
pays tax on the gain or takes a deduction for the loss. See I.R.C. § I001(c) (West 1991); 
CHIRELSTEIN supra note 99, at 239. The term "realize" means that the entity experiences a 
gain or loss as a result of the transaction. See I.R.C. § 1001(b); CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 99, 
at 239. 
104 The amount of loss from a sale of property is the excess of the property's adjusted 
basis-in this case, $IOO-over the amount realized by the bank-here, $20. See I.R.C. 
§ 1001(a); Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205 (Law and Analysis, Situation 1). 
105 See I.R.C. § IOll; Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205 (Law and Analysis, Situation 
1). 
106 See Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205 (Facts, Situation 1). This example is extremely 
simple. In reality, the IRS treats the foreign currency as property and recognizes that 
restrictions on exchange and use of the currency and other limitations imposed by the debtor 
country, with respect to debt swaps, may decrease the fair market value of the currency. [d. 
(Law and Analysis, Situation 1); Berkson & Cohen, supra note 62, at 578. Thus, after 
considering all factors, the fair market value of the local currency may not be worth exactly 
$50. This limitation only reduces the amount of the MNC's immediately recognized gain and 
basis in the stock; it does not reduce the value of the local currency to the price the MNC 
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dollar value of the local currency received ($50) minus the MNC's 
basis in the obligation ($20), or $30.107 The MNC then exchanges 
the local currency for stock in a foreign corporation. lOB Thus, the 
MNC's basis in the stock it receives becomes the fair market value 
of the local currency that it exchanged for the stock. 109 This situa-
tion is probably the least desirable situation for the MNC, because 
it must immediately recognize, for tax purposes, a $30 gain. Because 
the MNC invests the local currency it receives in stock of a foreign 
corporation, the MNC will have to pay the taxes on the gain out of 
money from income that is unrelated to this debt swap transaction. 
b. The bank exchanges the obligation for stock in a foreign corporation l1O 
Assume the same facts as above: the bank holds a $100 obli-
gation from a foreign country whose Central Bank will redeem the 
debt in local currency for 50% of its face value. lll In this situation, 
the bank delivers the obligation to the Central Bank. 112 The Central 
Bank then credits the foreign corporation's account with the equiv-
alent of $50 in local currency.113 In return, the foreign corporation 
gives the bank $50 worth of its stock. 114 
The IRS treats this transaction as if it involves two steps. First, 
the bank sells the $100 obligation to the Central Bank for $50 worth 
of local currency.115 Thus, the bank recognizes a loss equal to the 
excess of the bank's adjusted basis in the obligation ($100) over the 
fair market value of the local currency ($50), or $50. 116 Second, the 
bank exchanges the local currency for stock in the foreign corpo-
ration. ll7 Because the bank's basis in the local currency is equal to 
the stock's fair market value, the bank recognizes no gain upon this 
exchange. liB The bank recognizes no gain unless, upon disposition 
paid for the obligation ($20). Berkson & Cohen, supra note 62, at 578. These restrictions and 
their effect on the fair market value of the currency received by the investor apply to the 
following four examples as well. See infra notes 110-147. 
107 See id. (Law and Analysis, Situation 1). 
108 See id. (Facts, Situation 1). 
109 See id. (Holdings, Situation 1). 
110 This situation is similar to Situation 2 in Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205. 
III See id. (Facts). 
112 See id. (Facts, Situation 2). 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 [d. (Law and Analysis, Situation 2). 
116 [d. 
117 [d. 
118 Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205 (Holdings, Situation 2); Berkson & Cohen, supra 
note 62, at 578. 
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of the stock at some later time, the bank sells it for an amount in 
excess of its basis. 1l9 
In the end, both parties profit in this situation. The bank not 
only receives some value for its non performing debt, but also can 
take a tax deduction for any loss it realizes. The foreign country, 
moreover, benefits from investment in its local corporations. 
c. The bank delivers the obligation to the Central Bank, which credits a 
charitable organization's accountl20 
Assume again that the bank holds a $100 obligation from a 
foreign country whose Central Bank will redeem the debt for $50 
worth of local currency. 121 The bank delivers the $100 obligation to 
the Central Bank. 122 The Central Bank credits the account of a 
qualified United States charitable organization with the equivalent 
of $50 in local currency, to be used within the foreign country.123 
Under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code, the charitable 
organization recognizes no taxable gain from this transaction. 124 
Similar to the previous situation, the IRS treats this transaction 
as consisting of two steps.125 The first step is the same, as the IRS 
again views the bank as selling the obligation-with a basis of $100-
to the Central Bank for local currency worth $50. 126 Thus, the bank 
realizes a loss of $50, for which it can take a deduction. 127 The 
second step, however, offers more benefits to the bank than in the 
previous situation. Because the bank contributes the local currency 
to a qualified charitable organization, the IRS allows the bank to 
take a charitable deduction for the value of the local currency, or 
$50. 128 Consequently, the bank recognizes a tax deduction for its 
119 See I.R.C. § 1001(c). 
120 The charitable organization must satisfy the requirements of I.R.C. § 170 (West 
1991). Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205 (Facts, Situation 3). This situation is similar to 
Situation 3 in Rev. Rul. 87-124. 
121 See Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205 (Facts). 
122 See id. (Law and Analysis, Situation 3). 
123 Id. (Facts, Situation 3). 
124 See I.R.C. § 501. 
125 Ronny J. Halperin, Comment, Revenue Ruling 87-124: Treasury's Flawed Interpretation 
of Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 721, 724 n.17 (1989). The bank, however, will 
still be permitted to transfer the obligation directly to the charitable organization in the 
country. Id. at 724-25. It need not actually take the two steps to complete the transaction. 
See id. 
126 Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205 (Law and Analysis, Situation 3). 
127 Id. (Law and Analysis, Situation 3). The bank's loss is equal to its adjusted basis in 
the obligation ($100) minus the amount it realizes from the sale ($50). Id. 
128 Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c)(I) (as amended in 1984). 
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entire $100 basis in the obligation. 129 Next to receiving full payment 
of the obligation, including interest, this situation is the most ad-
vantageous for the bank. Because the transaction effectively dis-
charges 50% of the country's debt, this situation is more advanta-
geous for the foreign country than the previous situations. 
Before Revenue Ruling 87-124, banks did not benefit from 
these particular contributions to the extent they benefit under the 
new rulingl30 because, in general, tax law limits the donor's charit-
able deduction to the fair market value of the property donated. 131 
Prior to this ruling, the IRS would have treated the above transac-
tion as involving only one step: the bank donating the $100 obli-
gation-with a fair market value of $20-to a charitable organiza-
tion. 132 The bank could have taken a deduction of only $20, the 
fair market value of the obligation. 133 The IRS did not acknowledge 
the sale of the obligation for the local currency. Thus, the bank did 
not recognize a loss of $50. Additionally, in the second step, the 
IRS determined the allowed charitable deduction based upon the 
fair market value of the obligation ($20) instead of the fair market 
value of the local currency ($50).134 This method produced a limited 
allowed deduction. Consequently, banks benefited more by selling 
the obligation at a discounted price. 135 If the bank in this situation 
sold the obligation for $20, it could recognize a loss of $80. 136 
By creating an exception for debt-for-equity swaps in Revenue 
Ruling 87-124 and viewing the transaction in two steps, the IRS 
created new incentive for banks to donate debt to charitable orga-
nizations instead of selling it. All parties to the transaction benefit: 
the bank recognizes a loss for its entire basis (though it does not 
retain its $20); the charitable organization recognizes no taxable 
gain; and the foreign country recognizes benefits through the char-
itable organization's use of the local currency within its country. 
d. The MNC donates the obligation to a United States charitable 
organization 
In this situation, assume again the same facts: the bank holds 
an obligation for $100 from a foreign country whose debt sells for 
'29 Halperin, supra note 125, at 725. 
130 See id. at 723-24. 
13' Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c)(l); Halperin, supra note 125, at 723-24. 
I>2 See Halperin, supra note 125, at 723-24. 
13. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1 70A-l(c)(I). 
134 See Halperin, supra note 125, at 724. 
135 See id. 
136 I.R.C. § 1001. 
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20% of its face value on the secondary market. 137 The MNC buys 
the obligation from the bank for $20. The bank's adjusted basis in 
the obligation is $100. Thus, as in the first situation, the bank 
recognizes a loss of $80. 138 The MNC's adjusted basis in the obli-
gation is its purchase price of $20. 139 When the MNC donates the 
obligation to a United States charitable organization, current tax 
law allows the MNC a deduction for the fair market value of the 
obligation at the time of the contribution. 140 Therefore, if the MNC 
immediately donates the obligation, it can take a deduction of the 
fair market value of the obligation, or $20. 
The charitable organization then redeems the obligation at the 
Central Bank for the equivalent of $50 in local currency that it will 
invest within the foreign country. Although the charitable organi-
zation realizes a gain as a result of this exchange, the IRS does not 
tax this gain. l4l Once again, this transaction benefits all parties: the 
bank takes a deduction for a loss; the MNC takes a charitable 
deduction; the charitable organization realizes no taxable gain upon 
the exchange of the obligation into local currency; and the foreign 
country profits from the investment. 
e. The charitable organization buys the obligation from the bank142 
Finally, again assume that the bank holds a $100 obligation 
from a foreign country whose debt sells for 20% of its face value 
on the secondary market. 143 The charitable organization buys the 
obligation from the bank for $20. As discussed in previous situa-
tions, the bank realizes a loss of $80, for which it can take a deduc-
tion.144 The charitable organization then redeems the obligation, in 
which it has a basis of $20,145 at the Central Bank for $50 in local 
currency. In contrast to the MNC's tax consequences, the charitable 
137 See Rev. Rut. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205 (Facts). 
138 See I.R.C. § 1001; see also supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
139 See I.R.C. § 1011; Rev. Rut. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205 (Law and Analysis, Situation 
I). 
140 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c)(l). Harvard hopes to participate in a similar situation 
in the future, rather than using funds from its endowment to finance a debt-for-education 
swap. See Harvard-Ecuador Plan Leads to Farming Project, HARV. U. GAZETTE, Jan. 11, 1991, at 
8 [hereinafter Harvard-Ecuador Farming Project]. 
141 I.R.C. § 501. The charitable organization, however, must use the currency in a way 
consistent with its charitable purpose. Id. § 501(b). 
142 This situation is similar to the debt-for-education swap between Harvard and Ecua-
dor, discussed infra in Part III. 
143 See Rev. Rut. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205 (Facts). 
144 See I.R.C. § 1001; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
145 See I.R.c. § 1012 (West 1991). 
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organization does not recognize a taxable gain from this ex-
change. 146 The charitable organization, however, may use this local 
currency only for investments that relate to its charitable purpose. 147 
This last situation again produces beneficial tax consequences for 
all parties to the transaction. The bank may take a deduction for 
most of its basis in the obligation, and the charitable organization 
does not have to recognize any gain from the exchange of the 
obligation into local currency that it can use to benefit the country. 
With respect to tax consequences, the ideal debt-for-equity 
swap involves some sort of charitable donation, either from a bank 
or an MNC. The next most desirable situation involves a charitable 
organization as an investor. Although Revenue Ruling 87-124 may 
have deterred some direct debt-for-equity swaps by banks and 
MNCs, it did create incentives to use other debt swap methods 
involving charitable donations of debt, such as debt-for-nature 
swaps or debt-for-education swaps discussed in the following parts 
of this Note. 
Even with the many risks and drawbacks to the various parties, 
debtor countries are still participating in and encouraging debt-for-
equity swaps. In fact, the debt swap has developed further into 
debt-for-development swaps. In debt-for-development swaps, the 
investor swaps discounted debt for the country's promise to use the 
debt for specific programs aimed at further development in the 
country.148 Of these debt swaps, the debt-for-nature swap is the 
most widely recognized by the public. 
C. Debt-for-Nature Swaps 
Debt-for-nature swaps endeavor to control the exploitation of 
natural resources while simultaneously responding to the country's 
needs. 149 In 1987, Conservation International (CI) became the first 
environmental organization to participate in a debt-for-nature swap 
with an LDC.150 In this relatively simple agreement, CI purchased 
$650,000 of Bolivia's debt on the secondary market for $100,000, 
146 I.R.C. § 501. 
147 [d. § 501(b). 
148 See generally Hamlin, supra note 6 (discussing debt-for-nature swaps, one type of debt-
for-development swap). 
149 [d. at 1065. 
150 [d. at 1068. 
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in exchange for Bolivia's promise to preserve 3.7 million unpro-
tected acres of the Bolivian lowland plain. I51 
Following this landmark swap, World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
negotiated three more swaps with Ecuador, Costa Rica, and the 
Philippines. I52 WWF's swap with Ecuador was more complex than 
any previous swap.I53 This agreement was similar to the debt-for-
education swap discussed below, in that it exchanged debt for bonds 
denominated in local currency. 154 WWF used a three-step procedure 
to convert $1 million of Ecuador's debt into a fund, the proceeds 
of which an Ecuadorian nature foundation would use for the pre-
servation of undeveloped lands. I55 
In this WWF-Ecuador debt-for-nature swap, WWF purchased 
$1 million of Ecuador's debt at 35% of its face value. I56 WWF 
exchanged the debt at the Central Bank for bonds repayable in 
Ecuadorian sucres. 157 WWF then donated this debt to Fundacion 
Natura, an Ecuadorian environmental group.I5S Fundacion Natura 
retained the bonds and received the proceeds from their sale. I59 
Finally, WWF and the Ecuadorian government agreed to let Fun-
dacion Natura use the proceeds from these bonds for protection of 
undeveloped lands, environmental education, and other activi-
ties. I60 The parties to the original debt-for-nature agreements in-
tended primarily to set aside land for the creation of natural 
reserves. Today, however, conservation organizations are concen-
trating more on the education and training of people to manage 
the reserves. I61 
In addition to helping pay for conservation, debt-for-nature 
swaps also have the potential to generate economic productivity by 
151 [d. at 1069. Bolivia also agreed to let CI participate in administrating the protected 
lands. [d. 
152 [d. at 1068. 
153 See generally iti. (providing a detailed explanation of the debt-for-nature swaps be-
tween these entities). 
154 See iti. at 1069. 
155 [d. 
156 Thomas E. Lovejoy, Applying Third-World Debt to the Environment, WASH. POST, Dec. 
26, 1990, at A25. 
157 Hamlin, supra note 6, at 1069. 
158 See iti. 
159 !d. 
160 Lovejoy, supra note 156, at A25. 
161 Reifenberg, supra note 34, at 22. See generally Hamlin, supra note 6 (discussing how 
debt-for-nature swaps benefit the participating parties). 
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increasing the number of national parks and increasing tourism. 162 
Although debt-for-nature swaps only relieve a minuscule portion 
of the debts, they have proved effective vehicles for using debt to 
benefit natural resources and development. 163 Moreover, these 
swaps provided good working models for the debt-for-education 
swap between Harvard University and Ecuador.164 
III. DEBT-FOR-EDUCATION SWAPS 
A. The Birth of the Idea 
The idea for a debt-for-education swap began when the Latin 
American Scholarship Program of American Universities (LAS-
PAU)165 went in search of more monies for scholarships.166 LAS-
PAU's fundamental premise is that "human resource development 
is crucial to modernization in developing countries and that eco-
nomic growth can occur only with enhanced technical knowledge 
and management skills within Latin American universities and re-
search centers."167 Ned Strong, Area Director of LASPAU, was in 
Argentina in 1987 when CI and WWF announced the first debt-
for-nature swaps. In conversations with an Argentine colleague, the 
idea for the debt-for-education swaps emerged. 168 When Mr. Strong 
returned from Argentina, he spoke with others at LASPAU about 
the idea. 169 Mr. Strong's interest in the feasibility of a debt-for-
education swap coincided with a State Department announcement 
that it would encourage and provide assistance for organizations 
162 Lovejoy, supra note 156, at A25. 
16. See generally Reifenberg, supra note 34, at 24-26 (discussing benefits to Costa Rica 
and Peru); Hamlin, supra note 6 (discussing benefits in swaps between WWF and the Phil-
ippines, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and between CI and Costa Rica). 
164 See Reifenberg, supra note 34, at 23. Reifenberg also discusses the debt-for-education 
swap in this paper. 
165 LASPAU was formed in 1964 when Harvard made a move to attract more Latin 
American students. Strong Interview I, supra note 9. It is now associated with about two 
hundred other universities, administering approximately one thousand to twelve hundred 
scholarships.ld. LASPAU adds between two hundred fifty and three hundred new scholar-
ships per year, and is currently working with the Fullbright program. Id. 
166 Sunder, supra note 9, at 5; Steve Reifenberg & Ned Strong, Debt-for-Education in 
Ecuador I (Summer 1990) (briefing memorandum prepared by LASPAU) (copy on file at 
the Boston College Third World Law Journal office). "Debt-for-education" will be used 
interchangeably with "debt-for-scholarship" throughout this Note. 
167 Reifenberg, supra note 34, at 1. 
168 Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
169 Id. 
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interested in participating in debt-for-education swaps that would 
give more Latin American students the opportunity to study in the 
United States. l7O 
In early 1988, LASPAU hired an intern from the Kennedy 
School of Government at Harvard, Steve Reifenberg, to explore 
whether a debt-for-education swap would be feasible or beneficial 
for LASPAU.171 At the end of the study, Mr. Reifenberg informed 
LASPAU that the only obstacles to a debt-for-education swap were 
the various regulations enacted by some LDCs that prohibited inves-
tors in debt swaps from changing local currency into dollars for use 
outside their country.172 
Coincidentally, in August 1988, Luis Parodi, a LASPAU sup-
porter, gained election to the Vice Presidency of Ecuador.173 LAS-
PAU approached Vice President Parodi in March 1989 with its idea 
for a human resource-development scholarship program for Ecu-
adorian students. 174 Impressed with the human resource develop-
ment idea, Vice President Parodi's only question was how to fund 
the program. 175 In May 1989, LASPAU suggested to Parodi that a 
debt-for-education swap might produce the funding for scholar-
ships; however, Ecuador would have to change its law to facilitate 
the transaction. 176 Subsequently, Parodi began to lobby the Ecu-
adorian government for changes in the Ecuadorian law regarding 
debt swaps.177 On October 31, 1989, Vice President Parodi's efforts 
succeeded when Ecuador enacted a regulation l78 governing debt 
170 Reifenberg, supra note 34 (Executive Summary); see Deputy Assistant Sec'y of State 
for Inter-American Affairs Paul D. Taylor, Remarks at Drexel Burnham Lambert Latin 
American Investors Conference (Jan. 29, 1988) [hereinafter Taylor Remarks] (copy on file 
at the Boston College Third World Law Journal office). 
171 Strong Interview I, supra note 14. For a discussion of Mr. Reifenberg's analysis and 
conclusions, see Reifenberg, supra note 34. 
172 Strong Interview I, supra note 9; Sunder, supra note 9, at 5. For example, under 
Ecuador's old regulation, if an organization paid fifteen cents per dollar for Ecuadorian debt 
purchased on the secondary market, it could give that debt to Ecuador and redeem it for 
100% of the face value in local currency. The organization could use this currency, however, 
for investments only in Ecuador. Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
173 Strong Interview I, supra note 9; Sunder, supra note 9, at 5. 
17. Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
175 [d. Parodi himself was a former university rector in Ecuador. Sunder, supra note 9, 
at 5. Thus, he would strongly support a program that created scholarships to enable Ecu-
adorian students to study at one of America's premier universities. 
176 Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
177 [d.; Sunder, supra note 9, at 5. 
178 La Junia Monetaria, No. 637-89, Oct. 31, 1989 (Ecuador) [hereinafter. Ecuadorian 
Regulation] (copies of Ecuadorian Regulation and English translation on file at the Boston 
College Third World Law Journal office). 
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swaps for social benefit entities. 179 The new regulation allows for-
eign entities to donate Ecuador's debt to any program that is socially 
beneficial to Ecuador, even if some of these programs require in-
vestments in foreign currency, such as United States dollars. 180 The 
Central Bank, however, will only exchange the debt for 50% of face 
value in local currency.181 
The following paragraph outlines some of the most important 
features of the Ecuadorian Regulation. Ecuador's Central Bank has 
set aside a maximum of $150 million in face value of its outstanding 
debt for these social benefit programs. 182 The government may not 
allocate more than $5 million in face value of this total to any single 
project. 183 The cash to finance the swaps must come from foreign 
countries and be in the form of a donation to an entity of the 
donor's choice, as long as the entity is qualified under the Ecuador-
ian Regulation. 184 Finally, the proposed debt swaps must meet three 
prerequisites to qualify under this regulation: (1) a legally consti-
tuted local Ecuadorian entity must receive the donation and dem-
onstrate that it can carry out the proposed program; (2) the donor 
must design the project with an investment plan and a budget; and 
(3) the National Development Council (CONADE) must approve 
179 LASPAU, Brief Background on Debt Swaps for Scholarships in Ecuador 1 (1990) 
(outlining the major components of the regulation) [hereinafter Brief Background] (copy on 
file at the Boston College Third World Law Journal office); Strong Interview I, supra note 
9; Walters, supra note 31, at 14. These social benefit entities include those non-profit, local 
entities, "whose objective is the realization of social or cultural, educational, amateur athletics 
and environmental protection activities." Ecuadorian Regulation, supra note 178, at art. I. 
Ecuador's Monetary Board recognized that, "one should take advantage of foreign donations 
to reduce the foreign debt." [d. at pmbl. 
1BO Strong Interview I, supra note 9. The programs must still benefit Ecuador. [d. Under 
Ecuador's old regulation, the investor could exchange the debt for 100% of its face value in 
local currency; however, the investor could use this currency only for investments within 
Ecuador. [d. Under the new regulation, the Central Bank will exchange the debt at only 50% 
of its face value, but the investor may use the local currency it obtained in or out of Ecuador. 
[d. Thus, it is possible for Harvard to exchange local currency from the sale of Ecuadorian 
bonds back into United States dollars, to be used for the scholarships. !d. 
lSI Ecuadorian Regulation, supra note 178, at art. IX; Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
This regulation applies to all debt swaps that are socially beneficial to Ecuador, whether in 
or out of the country. Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
1S2 Ecuadorian Regulation, supra note 178, at art. VII. This is probably to minimize 
inflationary risks. Strong Interview I, supra note 9. Although the Ecuadorian Regulation 
states that a maximum of $50 million will be set aside for these programs, the Ecuadorian 
government has increased this amount to $150 million. Interview with Ned Strong, Area 
Director of Latin American Scholarship Program of American Universities, in Cambridge, 
Mass. (Feb. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Strong Interview II]. 
183 Ecuadorian Regulation, supra note 178, at art. III. 
184 !d. at art. I. 
1992] SWAPPING DEBT FOR EDUCATION 179 
the project. 185 With the Ecuadorian Regulation in place, LASPAU 
only had to find a donor of the debt. 186 
B. The Harvard-Ecuador Agreement 
Because Harvard University's former president, Derek Bok, 
had recently announced a plan to "internationalize" Harvard,187 the 
University seemed the appropriate entity to approach with the idea 
for a debt-for-education swap with Ecuador.188 In November 1989, 
Harvard University, along with LASPAU and the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts, hosted Vice President Parodi. 189 During his stay, 
Vice President Parodi met with Derek Bok to discuss the possibility 
of Harvard participating in a debt-for-education swap with Ecua-
dor.190 Intrigued by the idea, Derek Bok formed a steering com-
mittee to study the proposal.191 Seven months later, in July 1990, 
Harvard and Fundacion Capacitar, an Ecuadorian educational 
foundation, signed the first-ever debt-for-education agreement. 192 
A group of leading Ecuadorian educators, government officials, 
and business people-including Vice President Parodi l93-orga-
nized Fundacion Capacitar in September 1989. 194 The organization 
is "dedicated to the training and development of students and 
professionals in the natural sciences, social sciences, technical areas, 
cultural areas, teaching, and, in general, any discipline that contrib-
utes to Ecuador's well-being."195 
185 Id. at art. IV. Because Parodi is President of CONADE, Harvard's debt-for-education 
swap was quickly approved. Brief Background, supra note 179. The Ecuadorian Regulation 
also governs the issuance of Ecuadorian bonds by the Central Bank, the interest due on 
those bonds, and their maturity dates. Ecuadorian Regulation, supra note 178, at art. VIII. 
186 Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
187 Sunder, supra note 9, at 1. Derek Bok was pressing the University to increase foreign 
student enrollment and expand foreign studies. Debt to Create Scholarships, supra note 33, at 
A18; Flint, supra note 8, at 25. 
188 Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
189 Sunder, supra note 9, at 5. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. Bok was especially intrigued when Parodi explained that his proposition meant 
Harvard would get back three dollars for everyone dollar it invested. Strong Interview I, 
supra note 9. 
192 Debt to Create Scholarships, supra note 33, at A18; Flint, supra note 8, at 25. 
193 Harvard-Ecuador Farming Project, supra note 140, at 13. 
194 Id.; see Agreement Between Harvard University and Fundacion Capacitar, July 9, 
1990, Harvard Univ.-Fundacion Capacitar, at I [hereinafter Agreement] (copy on file at the 
Boston College Third World Law Journal office). 
195 Agreement, supra note 194, at 1. Capacitar means "to train." Strong Interview I, supra 
note 9. 
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Harvard credits the signing of the agreement to Vice President 
Parodi. Without Parodi's efforts to lobby for changes in the regu-
lation, this agreement never would have succeeded. 196 The debt-
for-education swap is an appealing way to develop a base of financial 
aid to provide for the costs of students from Ecuador.197 
C. How the Debt-for-Education Swap Works 
Under the agreement, Harvard pledged to buy a portion of 
Ecuador's debt at a discount and donated the debt, in the form of 
a note, to Fundacion Capacitar. 198 Fundacion Capacitar then re-
deemed the note at the Central Bank for 50% of its face value in 
local currency bonds. 199 Fundacion Capacitar sold these bonds to 
entities within Ecuador at a discount. 2oo Using the majority of the 
proceeds from the sales, Fundacion Capacitar purchased United 
States dollars on the local market.201 It then invested the dollars in 
an interest bearing fund in the United States, to be used for schol-
arships for eligible Ecuadorian students to study at Harvard.202 
Fundacion Capacitar kept the smaller portion in Ecuadorian sucres 
that will finance research and study in Ecuador by Harvard students 
and professors.203 
More specifically, the debt swap works as follows. Harvard 
bought $5 million of Ecuador's debt on the secondary market from 
Chase Manhattan Bank in New York, at 15.5% of the debt's face 
value.204 Thus, Harvard's total investment in the transaction was 
196 Sunder, supra note 9, at 5. 
197 See Debtfor-Scholarship Swap Made, AP, July 12, 1990, at 2, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, AP File (quoting Derek Bok). 
198 Reifenberg & Strong, supra note 166, at 2; Walters, supra note 31, at 14. Because 
Ecuador enacted its new regulation directed specifically at programs like debt-for-education 
swaps, Harvard did not need a waiver from Ecuador's Central Bank obligating the Central 
Bank to redeem the note. See supra note 43. 
199 Reifenberg & Strong, supra note 166, at 2; Walters, supra note 31, at 14. 
200 Reifenberg & Strong, supra note 166, at 2. 
201 [d. 
202 [d.; Walters, supra note 31, at 14. Scholarships may be full or partial. Agreement, 
supra note 194 (Annex C). 
20S Reifenberg & Strong, supra note 166, at 2 . 
• 04 Telephone Interview with Frank Connors, University Attorney, Harvard University 
(Feb. 5, 1991) [hereinafter Connors Interview]; see Sunder, supra note 9, at 1,5. The differ-
ence between the figures in the published articles and figures in this article occurs because 
Harvard ultimately bought the debt for 15.5% of face value, instead of 15% of face value. 
Strong Interview I, supra note 9. For a diagram of the process, see Sunder, supra note 9, at 
5 (Debt for Education: The Ecuador Model). 
A consolidation agreement among lenders to Ecuador posed a potential threat to the 
transaction. Connors Interview, supra. This agreement stipulates that if one lender receives 
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$775,000.205 Harvard then donated this debt to Fundacion Capa-
citar.206 Fundacion Capacitar exchanged the debt at Ecuador's Cen-
tral Bank for local currency bonds at half the face value, or $2.5 
million.207 It then sold these bonds on the local market at approxi-
mately 85% of their local value.20B Finally, Fundacion Capacitar 
converted the proceeds from these sales, approximately $2 mil-
lion,209 back into dollars and placed them into a scholarship fund 
in the United States.210 The Harvard Management Company, which 
administers Harvard's endowment as well as various other trusts, 
manages this fund. 211 Fundacion Capacitar, however, continues to 
own the fund. 212 
full payment of its obligation from Ecuador, then Ecuador must pay all other lenders in full. 
ld. In addition, all potential buyers of Ecuador's debt must receive approval to buy it from 
a servicing agent-in this case, Citibank. ld. Thus, when Harvard bought the debt, it became 
a party to this consolidation agreement. ld. When Harvard then donated the entire debt to 
Fundacion Capacitar, which also became a party to the agreement, it left itself open to a 
potential breach of contract suit by one of the member banks. ld. Fortunately, this threat 
never arose. ld. 
205 Strong Interview I, supra note 9; Sunder, supra note 9, at 1,5. At this point, Harvard 
assumed creditor status with respect to Ecuador. Although Harvard paid only $775,000 to 
purchase the debt, Ecuador's obligation to Harvard remained $5 million because Harvard 
still held the $5 million note. 
206 Sunder, supra note 9, at 1,5; Strong Interview I, supra note 9. Harvard now relin-
quished its creditor status, and Fundacion Capacitar assumed creditor status with respect to 
Ecuador. Similar to the situation supra note 205, although Fundacion Capacitar paid nothing 
for the note, Ecuador technically still owed $5 million to Fundacion Capacitar. 
207 Sunder, supra note 9, at I, 5. In this way, Harvard's donation experiences the 
"multiplier effect;" in effect, its donation of $775,000 more than triples to the $2,500,000 
value. Reifenberg, supra note 34, at 8. Fundacion Capacitar faced no local restrictions on its 
conversion of the note to local currency. Connors Interview, supra note 204. 
There was no agreement between Harvard and Ecuador's Central Bank that the Central 
Bank would redeem the note. ld. Harvard acted only on the good faith and representation 
of the people in Ecuador, such as Luis Parodi. ld. 
208 Sunder, supra note 9, at 1,5. Ecuador's $5 million foreign obligation is now effectively 
eliminated in exchange for a $2.5 million internal obligation to the local bondholders. See 
Flint, supra note I, at A14. In other words, Fundacion Capacitar's sale of the bonds on the 
Ecuadorian local market eliminates Fundacion Capacitar's creditor status; the bondholders 
are now the creditors with respect to Ecuador's $2.5 million internal debt. See id. Some 
financial analysts expressed skepticism regarding the sale of Ecuadorian bonds on the inter-
national market; however, Teresa Petras, Vice President in charge of Ecuadorian debt trading 
at J.P. Morgan, feels confident that there is a limited secondary market for the bonds within 
Ecuador. Debt to Create Scholarships, supra note 33, at A18. 
209 Sunder, supra note 9, at I, 5 (Debt for Education Model). The discrepancy between 
the total proceeds of the sale and the final amount put in the scholarship fund results from 
discounts on the bonds, administrative cost, and fees totaling approximately 8%. Strong 
Interview I, supra note 9. 
210 This swap is different from other debt swaps because the debt is turned back into 
dollars. Walters, supra note 31, at 14. 
211 Connors Interview, supra note 204. 
212 ld. 
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Because Fundacion Capacitar owns the fund, the donor realizes 
no gain. Thus, Revenue Ruling 87-124 would not affect this swap, 
even if a non-exempt organization was the donor of the debt. 213 
This transaction is similar to the situation in which the charitable 
organization buys the obligation from the bank, described previ-
ously in this Note.214 Here, Harvard, a charitable organization, 
bought $5 million debt on the secondary market for $775,000. 
Chase Manhattan, the bank that sold the debt, can now take a 
deduction for the loss it realized through the sale, the difference 
between its adjusted basis and the sale price of $775,000.215 It 
follows that although Harvard received nothing from Fundacion 
Capacitar in exchange for the note, Harvard cannot take a deduc-
tion because it is a tax-exempt organization. Because Harvard do-
nated the debt to Fundacion Capacitar before the currency was 
exchanged, Fundacion Capacitar is the only party to the transaction 
that may have to recognize a gain.216 
Even if Harvard was a non-exempt MNC, it would have paid 
no taxes. Again, assuming the MNC donated the note before it was 
exchanged for local currency, the only entity to realize a gain in the 
transaction would be Fundacion Capacitar. The IRS may have al-
lowed the MNC a charitable deduction if Fundacion Capacitar uti-
lized the money it received from the donation for activities related 
to its charitable purpose. 
As designed, the fund will yield approximately $150,000 an-
nually for expenditures in the United States and Ecuador-schol-
arships in United States dollars for Ecuadorian students and grants 
in Ecuadorian sucres for Harvard faculty and students.217 The $2 
million core of the fund will remain untouched.21B Fundacion Ca-
pacitar will divide the interest from the fund into two parts: it will 
use 85%-approximately $127,500-in United States currency to 
m See supra notes 92-147 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text. 
215 See I.R.C. § 1012; I.R.C. § 501. 
216 Fundacion Capacitar may have to recognize a gain under Ecuador's tax laws. With 
respect to the federal tax laws of the United States, however, Fundacion Capacitar will not 
have to recognize a gain on the redemption of the $5 million note to the Central Bank. As 
a foreign entity not engaged in a trade or business in the United States, Fundacion Capacitar 
is beyond the reach of United States domestic tax laws. On the other hand, Fundacion 
Capacitar may be subject to tax on the interest generated from the fund. See I.R.C. § 61 
(West 1991). 
217 Sunder, supra note 9, at 5 (Debt for Education Model). This estimation assumes a 
7.5% yield. 
218 Reifenberg & Strong, supra note 166, at 2. 
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fund the scholarships for Ecuadorian students; the remaining 15% 
in local currency-approximately $22,500-will be used to fund 
local costs for research and study in Ecuador by students and pro-
fessors from Harvard.219 Harvard predicts that about seventy peo-
ple (from both Harvard and Ecuador) will benefit from this trans-
action over the next ten years.220 The intention of the parties is to 
continue the agreement permanently;221 the agreement, however, 
provides that, during the tenth year, the parties must conduct a 
formal evaluation of the program.222 
D. Responsibilities of the Parties 
The debt-for-education agreement lists the responsibilities of 
Harvard and Fundacion Capacitar.223 With respect to the scholar-
ships, Fundacion Capacitar will be responsible for accepting all 
applications as well as recruiting, advising and counseling the ap-
plicants, and assisting them with the application process and dead-
lines.224 Harvard will be responsible for assisting in recruitment of 
students and receiving applications for admission.225 In addition, 
Harvard will provide information necessary for applicants to apply 
for financial aid if they have not already done SO.226 Finally, Harvard 
must make its admissions decisions between January and April of 
each year.227 
In addition to sharing recruiting responsibilities, the parties 
must establish a committee that will make resource allocations for 
the following year's activities.228 This committee will also award the 
scholarships annually in April.229 To be eligible to receive a schol-
arship, the applicant must complete a standard Harvard application, 
219 Sunder, supra note 9, at 5 (Debt for Education Model). 
220 [d. at 1. 
221 Agreement, supra note 194, at 3. 
222 [d. In addition, the agreement provides that either party may terminate the agree-
ment upon one year's prior written notice to the other party. [d. In the case of termination, 
the agreement provides guidelines for distributing the funds between the parties. [d. 
223 [d. (Annex C). 
224 [d. 
225 [d. Harvard must accept all applicants before they qualify for Fundacion Capacitar 
scholarships. Strong Interview I, supra note 14. 
226 Agreement, supra note 194 (Annex C). 
227 /d. 
228 [d. 
229 [d. The committee shall be composed of representatives from Harvard University, 
Fundacion Capacitar, and LASPAU. [d. Scholarship decisions must take place in March or 
April of each year. [d. 
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with an essay, and a standard financial aid application.230 The com-
mittee will award scholarships primarily on the basis of need.231 It 
will grant many of the scholarships to Ecuadorians who wish to 
pursue graduate degrees. 232 Other scholarships will go to Ecuador-
ian professors, most of whom have relatively lower incomes.233 In 
addition, Harvard expects to award some scholarships to mid-level 
professionals, most of whom are middle class.234 The committee will 
also consider an applicant's proposed area of study and place of 
origin within Ecuador.235 The committee permits applicants to 
choose any area of study at the undergraduate, graduate, or profes-
sional leve1.236 Mr. Strong, Area Director of LASPAU, did not in-
dicate that the applicants' choice of any particular area of study 
would weigh strongly in their favor. 237 He did imply, however, that 
areas of study most beneficial to Ecuador upon the student's return 
are preferable. Finally, to prevent a "brain drain," the committee 
will award the scholarships to Ecuadorian students in the form of 
loans.238 When the student returns to Ecuador, Fundacion Capacitar 
will automatically forgive the loan.239 
With respect to the research and study grants, Fundacion Ca-
pacitar is responsible for supporting research, internships, and 
study by assisting in making professional connections and providing 
logistical support where needed.240 For Harvard's part, it must en-
courage applications for grants from the different departments, 
faculties, professional schools, programs, and institutes.241 The 
above-mentioned committee must decide the general areas of in-
terest and the number of grants it will award for the Harvard 
students' and professors' research, internships, and study in Ecua-
dor.242 Because the committee will award grants on a rolling basis, 
230 Agreement, supra note 194 (Annex C). 
231 Jean Evangelauf, Haroard to Buy $5-Million of Ecuador's Debt to Create Scholarship Fund, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER Eouc., July IS, 1990, at I; Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
232 Strong Interview II, supra note IS2. 
233 Id. 
234 [d. Applicants usually are sponsored by an Ecuadorian company and guaranteed a 
full-time job when they return. [d. 
235 /d. Mr. Strong said that the committee would place strong emphasis on awarding 
scholarships to students from the provinces. /d. Difficulties arise, however, because students 
from the provinces are less likely to speak sufficient English to study at Harvard. [d. 
236 [d.; Reifenberg & Strong, supra note 166, at I. 
237 Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
238 Evangelauf, supra note 231, at 1. 
239 [d. 
240 Agreement, supra note 194 (Annex C). 
241 [d. 
242 [d. 
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the committee must appoint a Harvard-based "grant review board" 
that will select those applicants who will receive grants based on the 
committee's standards.243 
To be eligible for a research and study grant, Harvard profes-
sors and students must propose projects that are beneficial to Ec-
uador.244 The committee will take requests and award grants on a 
rolling basis.245 Ecuador prefers projects in areas such as urban and 
regional planning, rural development, health care, and teaching.246 
The committee possibly will consider programs in ecology, environ-
mental studies, and natural sciences.247 
E. Benefits of the Swap 
Proponents of the debt-for-education swap have described it as 
a "lose-lose" situation turned around to benefit all.248 The bank 
benefits because it has removed questionable debt obligations from 
its books and replaced them with dollars.249 Harvard moves toward 
its goal of increasing its enrollment of foreign students.25o Harvard 
also benefits as its increasing presence in Ecuador more effectively 
attracts highly qualified candidates from that country.251 In addition 
to its presence in Ecuador, Harvard receives positive public relations 
benefits worldwide.252 The debt swap also enables more Harvard 
professors and students to gain valuable experience through in-
ternships and research in Ecuador.253 Furthermore, Harvard's ini-
tial donation of $775,000 tripled to a value of $2 million.254 Finally, 
by using local currency to fund these grants, Harvard frees valuable 
dollars of its scholarship fund that may have gone to finance these 
grants.255 It can use these freed funds for additional scholarships.256 
243 [d. 
244 Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
245 Agreement, supra note 194 (Annex C). 
246 Reifenberg & Strong, supra note 166, at 2; Strong Interview I, supra note 9. Some 
ideas suggested by potential candidates for the grants are listed in Reifenberg & Strong, 
supra note 166, at 2. 
247 Reifenberg & Strong, supra note 166, at 2. 
248 See Debt-for-Scholarship Swap Made, supra note 197, at l. 
249 Reifenberg, supra note 34, at 4. 
250 Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
251 [d. 
252 Reifenberg & Strong, supra note 166, at 2; Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
253 Sunder, supra note 9, at I; Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
254 See Reifenberg, supra note 34, at 8. 
255 See Reifenberg, supra note 34 (Executive Summary). 
256 [d. 
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The benefits for Ecuador and its citizens are also numerous. 
First, more lower and middle class Ecuadorians will receive the 
benefit of a Harvard education.257 These students will most likely 
return with their skills to Ecuador.258 Educating students will build 
human capital necessary for economic growth that Ecuador needs 
to contribute to debt reduction efforts.259 Second, Ecuador will 
retire some of its foreign debt. 260 Although this amount is minimal 
compared to its total debt, the benefits Ecuador receives through 
the agreement make the small amount more valuable.261 
F. Risks and Drawbacks of the Swap 
The only drawbacks for Harvard and Fundacion Capacitar are 
the administrative and financial complexities inherent in any debt 
swap.262 These problems, however, are minor. In contrast, the debt 
swap does pose some risks for Ecuador.263 When Harvard donates 
the $5 million of foreign debt to Fundacion Capacitar and it con-
verts the note to bonds in sucres, at 50% of face value, the govern-
ment still has an outstanding internal debt equal to $2.5 million.264 
Some critics contend that because the government must raise money 
to pay interest on the bonds, it will raise taxes, close hospitals, or 
print money to handle the internal debt. 265 Given the benefits of 
the investment in human resource development, however, the gov-
ernment of Ecuador profits by having half as much debt outstand-
ing in local currency instead of 100% debt in foreign currency that 
it must service immediately.266 As with other debt swaps, the risk of 
257 Flint, supra note I, at AI4. Miguel Falconi, Fundacion Capacitar's President, says this 
is the main purpose of the agreement. Walters, supra note 31, at 14. 
258 Flint, supra note I, at AI4; Strong Interview I, supra note 9; see also infra notes 269-
71 and accompanying text. 
259 Taylor Remarks., supra note 170, at 5; see also Reifenberg, supra note 34 (Executive 
Summary). 
260 Harvard-Ecuador Farming Project, supra note 140, at 13. 
261 See Debra Rosenberg & Lydia Denworth, Swapping Debt for Knowledge, NEWSWEEK, 
July 30, 1990, at 47. Five million dollars is miniscule compared to Ecuador's $ll billion debt. 
See Harvard Sets Up Fund, supra note 3, at 3; Flint, supra note I, at AI4. Hopefully, however, 
the swap will play a part in enlarging the scope of human resource development. See 
Reifenberg, supra note 34, at 2. 
262 Reifenberg, supra note 34 (Executive Summary). 
26' Flint, supra note I, at AI4. 
264 See id. 
265 [d. 
266 See Walters, supra note 31, at 14 (quoting Robert Scott, Vice President of Finance at 
Harvard University). 
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inflation is always present.267 Proponents of debt swaps are not 
worried, however, because the amount involved in these transac-
tions is generally too small to be inflationary.268 
One of the strongest arguments against the program is that the 
Ecuadorian recipients of the scholarships will not return to Ecuador 
upon completion of their degrees. Fundacion Capacitar, however, 
takes steps to ensure that they will return.269 One important factor 
in choosing applicants is what type of job they hold in Ecuador.270 
Based upon his experience working with LASPAU-administered 
scholarships, Ned Strong concluded that 99% of the people usually 
return to their home countries.271 
One criticism levied against the agreement is that there may be 
risks in taking students from provincial Ecuadorian culture to a 
completely different culture at Harvard.272 Additionally, the pro-
gram's desire to benefit both provincial and urban students may be 
difficult to achieve because most English-speaking Ecuadorians live 
in the cities.273 Finally, the attempt to reach provincial students may 
be hindered somewhat because in countries like Ecuador, the levels 
of primary, secondary, and higher education in rural areas are 
low.274 Thus, structural problems in Ecuador's educational system 
work against Fundacion Capacitar's and Harvard's efforts to attract 
Ecuadorians from rural areas. 275 Consequently, the effort to reach 
rural students may ultimately be nothing more than "a symbolic 
effort to show goodwill" on Harvard's part.276 
267 Laura Caldwell, Swapping Debt to Preserve Nature, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 11, 
1990, at 19; Flint, supra note 1, at A14. 
268 Flint, supra note I, at A 14. In addition, Ecuador limited the amount of debt foreign 
investors could convert to $50 million. Strong Interview I, supra note 9. 
269 Strong Interview II, supra note 182; see Evangelauf, supra note 231, at I. 
270 Strong Interview II, supra note 182. Applicants whom the Committee considers 
unlikely to return will not be chosen for these particular scholarships. /d. 
271 [d. 
272 Walters, supra note 31, at 14. Eric Ehrmann, a journalist who writes on Latin 
American affairs, contends that Ecuadorian students who do not really know any system 
other than the post-feudal system of large landholding interests may be in for a culture shock 
at Harvard Yard. [d. The program is not intended to reach the peasants in the potato fields, 
however. Strong Interview II, supra note 182. In addition, applicants may have spent some 
time in the United States, either working or studying. [d. 
273 Each applicant'S English skills will be reviewed. Strong Interview II, supra note 182. 
Those receiving the scholarships will attend intensive English classes prior to starting classes 
at Harvard. [d. 
274 Strong Interview II, supra note 182. 
275 [d. 
276 [d. 
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G. Present Status of the Program 
In the first year, Fundacion Capacitar received between seventy 
and ninety applications from Ecuadorian students.277 Only about 
twenty of those applicants speak English well enough to gain ad-
mission to Harvard.278 When Harvard makes its decisions regarding 
admission to the University, the committee would ideally like to 
award between three and four scholarships.279 As of September 
1991, Harvard has already enrolled one of these scholarship recip-
ients.28o 
With respect to the grants, the program has already awarded 
grants to two Harvard graduate students.281 These students pres-
ently are in Ecuador to begin developing an organic farming sys-
tem.282 Both of these students have extensive prior experience in 
Latin American countries. 283 Additionally, Harvard is in the process 
of creating a committee of faculty members to consider proposals 
for these grants by faculty members.284 
Finally, LASPAU received a $93,000 grant from the Ford Foun-
dation to produce a handbook on the debt-for-education pro-
gram.285 The Ford Foundation expects other educational institu-
tions, considering this method of funding international students, to 
benefit from Harvard's experiences.286 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the debt-for-education swap is beneficial to all parties. 
Harvard discovered that the governments of Third World countries 
are actively seeking arrangements that guarantee scholarships for 
their students as well as practical assistance from the Americans 
who go to their countries on grants.287 Harvard is contemplating 
277 Strong Interview I, supra note 9. In the second round, announced in June 1991, 
Fundacion Capacitar has so far received 110 applications. Telephone Interview with Ned 
Strong, Area Director of Latin American Scholarship Program of American Universities 




281 Harvard-Ecuador Farming Project, supra note 140, at 1. 
282 Id. at 1,8. 
283 Id. at 1. 
284 Strong Telephone Interview, supra note 277. 
285 Harvard-Ecuador Farming Project, supra note 140, at 8. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
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similar debt-for-education swaps with other countries.288 It is now, 
however, seeking private donors to buy the debt and donate it to 
Harvard for these purposes.289 With respect to the tax conse-
quences, this type of donation would be beneficial to all parties: the 
bank could take a loss; the buyer could take a charitable contribution 
deduction; and Harvard would not recognize a tax on any gain 
because ,it is a non-profit organization. In addition, in future swaps, 
Harvard will prefer to work with countries that historically pro-
duced candidates who demonstrated a strong potential for schol-
arship and in which interest in educating their citizens at Harvard 
is already high. 290 Drawing from Harvard's experiences with its first 
debt-for-education swap, other universities have begun developing 
their own similar agreements with Third World countries. 291 
Even though these programs may cause only a small dent in 
the debt of Third World nations, ultimately the human resources 
and skills that the scholarship recipients develop benefit all parties 
concerned. The American University gains international recogni-
tion and more cultural diversity of its student body, and the partic-
ipating country gains educated citizens who can use their education 
to further develop their country. Thus, more organizations should 
continue to expand on the idea of debt-for-education swaps and 
develop other creative ways to relieve Third World debt. Many 
Third World nations could benefit from programs like the debt-
for-education swap between Harvard and Ecuador. 
Jennifer F. Zaiser 
288 Strong Telephone Interview, supra note 277. In fact, Harvard has completed another 
debt·for·education swap with Mexico, similar to the debt-for-education swap with Ecuador. 
/d. 
289 Id. Nancy Pyle, Harvard's Special Assistant to the President for International Affairs, 
says, "Although Harvard received an excellent return on its investment in this case, I think 
it's important to note that the University did not make a profit; it simply found a way to 
multiply its scholarship aid resources." Id. 
290 Harvard-Ecuador Farming Project, supra note 140, at 8. A representative from Harvard 
has already spoken to ambassadors from Argentina and Costa Rica. Sunder, supra note 9, at 
1. 
291 Strong Interview I, supra note 9. University of California at Los Angeles is nearing 
completion of its negotiations, as is the University of Pittsburgh. Id. In addition, the Oregon 
State University System has completed transactions in Ecuador. Strong Telephone Interview, 
supra note 277. A consortium of southern and western universities has also established a 
fund in Mexico. Id. 

